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Abstract
Purpose
– There is little reason a priori to expect that a cooperative firm’s capital needs are different from a non-
cooperative firm’s needs if the two firms are otherwise similar in function and size and operate within similar
market economies. However, the notion that cooperatives face capital constraints that investor-owned firms
(IOFs) do not is a persistent theme in the literature. The paper aims to discuss these issues.
Design/methodology/approach
– The authors revisit this hypothesis with an empirical examination of capital constraints in a panel data set of
US agricultural supply and grain cooperatives and IOFs.
Findings
– The findings are mixed. While the authors find little to suggest that cooperatives face financial constraints on
borrowing in the short run, relative to IOFs, the authors do find some evidence that for long-term
investments, a capital constraint may exist.
Originality/value
– These short and long run differences have implications for the survival and growth of agricultural
cooperatives. While in the short run, access to debt financing allows these firms to operative profitably,
ultimately long-term large investments in technology and fixed assets will be required to maintain
competitiveness in this industry.
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The Cooperative Capital Constraint Revisited1 
Ziran Li, Keri Jacobs, and Georgeanne Artz2 
 
Among the major issues facing contemporary agricultural cooperatives are challenges 
related to identifying the financing activities and equity capital management strategies that will 
lead to growth and longevity (Barton, et al., 2011).  There is little reason a priori to expect that a 
cooperative firm’s capital needs are different from a non-cooperative firm’s needs if the two firms 
are otherwise similar in function and size, and operate within similar market economies (Cobia 
and Brewer, 1989).  “Cooperatives are not immune from market forces.  They must meet the 
same market test that investor oriented firms meet” (Ginder, 1999, p. 8).  However, cooperative 
finance outcomes and their choices in meeting financing needs are purported to be unique from 
non-cooperative firms.  In particular, cooperatives may be constrained in acquiring sufficient risk 
capital to finance investments which may in turn limit their growth and ultimately their 
competitiveness.  The essence of this uniqueness derives from a number of defining 
characteristics of cooperatives:  they operate with the “user-owner” principle; there is an implied 
obligation to pay out accumulated allocated equity to members; they face special tax 
consequences for profits distributed on the basis of use[1]; and investment, financing, and 
operational choices may not be driven by profit maximization as the primary objective, as it is 
with investor-owned firms (IOFs) (Iliopoulos, 2003; Chaddad and Cook, 2002; Cook, 1995; 
Lerman and Parliament, 1993; Cobia and Brewer, 1989).  Whether and the extent to which these 
characteristics imply relatively higher or lower reliance on debt by cooperatives remains unsettled 
in previous theoretical and empirical literature.  Further, an important consideration in the capital 
structure discussion, one overlooked in the literature, is the mechanism by which the resulting 
capital structure is achieved.   
                                                            
1 Submitted November 7, 2014, accepted February 18, 2015. 
2 Ziran Li is a graduate student in the Department of Economics at Iowa State University; Drs. Keri Jacobs 
and Georgeanne Artz are assistant professors in the Department of Economics at Iowa State University. 
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This paper seeks to examine the issue of capital constraints on U.S. agricultural supply 
and grain cooperatives and investor-owned firms.   The objective of this investigation is two-fold: 
1) identify whether cooperatives and IOFs have different capital structures; and 2) assess if the 
observed capital structure is the result of differences in operating and financial decisions that can 
be measured.  A variant of the DuPont model – a decomposition of a firm’s rate of return to 
equity into measures that relate to profitability, efficiency in asset use, and leverage – permits an 
empirical comparison between IOFs and cooperatives on their activities, debt structure, equity, 
and liquidity factors. Using firm-level panel data of financial information for cooperative and IOF 
agricultural grain and supply firms in Iowa, the two ownership types are compared to identify 
whether significant differences exist in their investment activities and financial efficiency.  
Restricting our analysis to a common industry and common geographic area limits the extent to 
which any differences in capital structure are due to heterogeneous market conditions.  The panel 
nature of the data is also an advantage of this study, since it allows us to control for time-invariant, 
unobserved firm-level characteristics.  
Our findings are mixed.  While cooperatives in our sample have significantly lower debt-
to-asset ratios than comparable IOFs, we do not find evidence that they face financial constraints, 
at least in the short run.  However, for financing long term assets, our data suggest that 
cooperatives tend to rely more on equity capital, which may reflect a constraint on borrowing. 
 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
 In cooperative theory, discussions of capital structure and access to capital are typically 
motivated by recognition of the “user-owner principle”; cooperatives are capitalized by those who 
use them and not by passive outside investors.  This is regarded as a limitation on their access to 
capital and, practically speaking, has implications on equity, leverage, and financial management 
decisions.  An examination of the literature reveals, however, that this principle can logically 
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result in a greater user of debt financing in some cases and lower use in others.  Thus, whether the 
user-owner principle necessarily leads to a different capital structure in cooperatives relative to 
similar IOFs is unclear.  As will be explored further, this is likely because of the competing 
interests of members in their three-way role as users, capital providers, and residual claimants to 
earnings.    
The user-owner principle implies the decision to use a cooperative is a joint decision by 
the producer to both use and invest in it.  The investment is the purchase of the membership stock 
and a retained allocation of the profits in the form of equity.  This principle not only limits the 
potential pool of investors – those who contribute equity to the business must also patronize the 
business – but also limits the rate at which equity can be acquired.  In a cooperative, equity is 
built through the allocation and retention of the co-op’s profits to its members. An agricultural 
supply or grain marketing firm operating as an IOF can solicit investors without the tied 
requirement to buy products or deliver grain, and an IOF does not rely on equity accumulation 
through profits.  For these reasons, it is often said that cooperatives are capital constrained, and 
the conclusion drawn is that cooperatives will rely more heavily on debt than their IOF 
counterparts for investments (Lerman and Parliament, 1990).  Cooperative equity accumulation is 
further challenged considering that members’ equity in a traditional cooperative is non-
marketable, non-transferable, and its stated value does not appreciate through changes in market 
values.  Also, if producers consider and weigh heavily the opportunity cost to investing in the 
cooperative instead of pursuing other investments (Soboh, Lansink and Van Dijk, 2012) – 
potentially in their own operation – added strains to equity accumulation occur.  Finally, 
illiquidity of members’ equity creates a horizon problem.  Older members who may soon retire 
from farming have little business incentive to support investments in long-term projects when the 
benefits from the investment will accrue to those who use the cooperative in the future (Porter 
and Scully, 1987; Knoeber and Baumer, 1983; Cook and Iliopolos, 2000). 
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 The user-owner principle not only impacts equity accumulation and management issues 
from producers’ perspectives, it has implications for a cooperative manager’s attitudes towards 
and propensity to take on risk. Cooperative managers may view the cooperative principle of risk 
sharing and mutual responsibility as an insurance policy, prompting them to assume more risk 
and borrow more heavily than managers of IOFs (Lerman and Parliament, 1990; Gentzoglanis, 
1997).  As a result, cooperatives may be less discriminating in their investments than IOFs, 
causing an overinvestment in assets and lower asset efficiency in generating profits. 
 While certain features of the cooperative business form imply a greater reliance on equity 
capital to finance investments relative to IOFs, other features suggest the contrary:  that 
cooperatives will rely more heavily on debt than equity to finance growth. The user-owner 
principle creates an implied obligation to return a co-op’s profits to members via equity 
redemption.  Patrons are allocated a portion of the current year’s savings (profits) proportional to 
their individual use, a portion of which is paid in cash to the patron-member and a portion 
retained as allocated member equity.  A member’s equity accumulates over time as s/he uses the 
cooperative and may be redeemed (paid) to the member at some time in the future. Lenders may 
not consider cooperative equity to be as secure as equity in IOFs because there is an expectation 
for cooperatives to eventually redeem in cash the equity held by their members.  
The illiquidity of member equity and the uncertainty surrounding the timeframe for 
redeeming member equity in a traditional cooperative has implications for management as well.  
Except by continued use, members do not expect a direct appreciation of their equity investment 
as investors in IOFs do, so managers may treat this portion of equity as a costless source of 
capital and members’ incentive to monitor management’s use of it may be weaker, leading both 
to ignore the opportunity costs of capital (Lerman and Parliament, 1990; Dahl and Dobson, 1976).  
If the opportunity cost of this capital is not realized, reliance on equity financing may be greater 
than in an IOF where stock is valued based on expectations and management outcomes.   
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 Even absent constraints on borrowing, cooperatives have an incentive to utilize equity 
capital in lieu of debt due to the differential tax treatment of profits in cooperatives.  Profits in an 
IOF are taxed at the entity level and any profits passed to owners through stock dividends are 
taxed again at the individual level. Most profits in a cooperative are taxed only once – at the 
cooperative level or member level – depending on how the profits are distributed.  The 
Modigliani-Miller theory of capital structure implies that the pass-through single taxation of 
earnings reduces the incentive for co-ops to maximize debt financing as compared with IOFs 
(Caves and Peterson, 1986).  IOFs use the cost of debt financing to reduce their taxable income 
but cannot do the same with dividends paid to stockholders.  Cooperatives deduct both the cost of 
borrowing and the profits distributed to patrons from taxable income, creating an additional 
incentive for equity financing, particularly when members and management do not assign the 
appropriate value or cost of equity capital. 
 Finally, differences in financing behavior and performance stem from differences in 
business objectives of cooperatives and non-cooperatives (Sexton and Iskow, 1993; Lerman and 
Parliament, 1993; Akridge and Hertel, 1992; Soboh, Lansink, Giesen, and Van Dijk, 2009; Soboh 
Lansink and Van Dijk, 2012).  Cooperatives must be profitable; however, within the scope of the 
user-owner principle, a cooperative can be managed to achieve an objective other than strict 
profit maximization, such as maximizing patronage payments, optimizing net prices to producers, 
maximizing value to members, and maximizing quantities of products sold and marketed.  The 
objective chosen by a cooperative will influence financing behavior. If the co-op positions itself 
in the purest sense of a cooperative – acting as an extension of the farm – then it will maximize 
members’ on-farm profits, leading to lower firm profitability, slower equity accumulation and, 
ceteris paribus, a greater proportional use of debt financing.  Conversely, a cooperative that 
pursues profit maximization will accumulate equity more quickly and be in a position to finance 
investments relying more heavily on equity.    
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Empirical Evidence 
  These theories of cooperatives provide reasons why one might expect a higher reliance 
on debt capital in some cases and a lower reliance in others.  As such, the question of relative 
debt becomes an empirical exercise. Not surprising, the evidence here, too, is mixed.  Lerman and 
Parliament’s (1990) analysis of capital structure in a sample of dairy firms finds debt to asset 
ratios are not significantly higher for cooperatives relative to IOFs.  A later study by these same 
authors finds cooperatives finance about half of investment in assets with equity, roughly the 
same as IOFs between 1973 and 1983, but significantly higher than IOFs after 1984, when IOFs 
reduced equity financing and used more long-term debt financing (Lerman and Parliament, 1993). 
Hardesty and Vikas (2007) report that California cooperatives in a variety of agricultural sectors 
(grain, dairy, fruit and vegetables, and farm supply) had lower debt-to-equity ratios than their 
counterpart IOFs.  In contrast, Gentzoglanis (1997) examines 12 large Canadian dairy firms – half 
cooperatives and half IOFs – from 1986 to 1991 and finds that cooperatives in the sample use 
significantly more debt than IOFs.  More recent investigations of the Italian wine sector and of 
agribusinesses in Greece similarly find that cooperatives have debt ratios higher than similar IOFs 
(Fazzini and Russ, 2014; Sergaki and Semos, 2006). 
 
Methodology 
A firm’s capital structure is the result of firm decisions as they react to market conditions.  
Because our ultimate goal is to contrast cooperative and IOF capital structures and understand 
why differences, if any, exist, we rely on the known relationships that exist between operational 
and financial outcomes.  The DuPont Profitability linkage model is used to decompose a firm’s 
return on equity ratio into its fundamental ratios: the asset turnover, profit margin, and leverage 
ratios.  DuPont analysis is widely utilized by analysts to identify the impact of managerial 
decisions on financial performance and interactions among important financial/efficiency ratios 
(Barnard and Boehlje, 2004).  This model has been introduced in the agricultural economics 
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literature as a diagnostic tool to understand the drivers of profitability and to identify which 
operational activities could be improved (Melvin et al., 2004).  Theoretical contributions to this 
topic have included analyzing the relationship between a firm’s decisions and capital structure 
(Collins, 1985) and the linkage between a firm’s production and investment decisions (Gabriel 
and Baker, 1980).  Featherstone et al. (1988) draw on Collins’ model to assess the impact of farm 
policies on farm financial leverage, while Mishra, Moss, and Erickson (2009) and Mishra et al. 
(2012) apply a DuPont expansion to analyze differences in rates of return on equity and key 
profitability drivers across regions and time at the farm level.  In this paper we utilize DuPont 
techniques to examine and compare the impact of important financial ratios on the capital 
structure of cooperative and investor-owned firms.  
 
Determinants of Capital Structure 
Collins (1985) derives the optimal capital structure – the debt to asset ratio – for a farm 
enterprise using the DuPont identity in an expected utility maximization framework in which the 
objective is to maximize the expected return on equity.  In that study, he assumes that firms 
choose a level of debt given their equity positions.   In reduced form, the optimal capital structure, 
δ* is a function of the expected return on assets E(RA), variance of the anticipated return on assets 
(ߪ஺ଶ), interest rate on debt (i), and risk aversion (ߩሻ: 
 ߜ∗ ൌ 	ߜሺܧሺܴ஺ሻ, ݅, ߩ, ߪ஺ଶሻ          (1) 
Following the DuPont expansion method, a firm’s return on assets, ܴ஺, can be 
decomposed into its profit margin and asset turnover ratios as follows: 
ܴ஺ ൌ గ஺ ൌ
గ
ௌ ∙
ௌ
஺ ,      (2) 
where π denotes profit (gross revenue minus the cost of production), A are total assets, and S is 
sales revenue.  The ratio of profit to sales ቀగௌ		ቁ, is profit margin ሺ݉ܽݎ݃݅݊ሻ, a measure of 
operating efficiency.  Asset turnover ሺܣܱܶሻ	measures how efficiently a firm’s assets are used to 
 
 
    8 
 
generate revenue, and is given by ቀௌ஺ቁ. Although an increase in either of these efficiency ratios 
creates a greater return on assets, they imply different things about a firm’s performance.   
Substituting (2) into (1), a firm’s optimal capital structure is: 
ߜ∗ ൌ 	ߜሺܧሺ݉ܽݎ݃݅݊ሻ, ܧሺܣܱܶሻ, ݅, ߩ, ߪ஺ଶሻ.      (3) 
Factors that increase a firm’s expected return on assets will also lead to greater leverage.  
Conversely, high interest rates, greater risk, and risk aversion tend to reduce a firm’s use of debt.  
Thus, a higher profit margin and asset turnover have positive impacts on 	ߜ∗ while higher interest 
rates and risk have negative impacts.  Cooperatives and IOFs choose a level of debt given their 
equity positions. Patrons of cooperatives are also the owners, thus, the different ownership 
structures of cooperatives and IOFs may give rise to different operational and financing strategies.  
 
 Data and Empirical Strategy 
 The data employed in this analysis are a panel of annual accounting information for 
approximately 100 agricultural grain marketing and supply co-ops and 50 IOFs in Iowa from 
1992 to 1995 collected by survey.   The firms were selected via random sample from the 
population of facilities licensed in Iowa with the Grain Warehouse Bureau of the Iowa 
Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship, the regulatory arm that monitors facilities 
licensed to store grain.   Financial data were provided by the Grain Warehouse Bureau from the 
required financial monitoring data they receive from all licensed facilities[2]  (Ginder and 
Baumler, 1997).   
Table 1 provides variable descriptions and summaries from the data; table 2 defines the 
ratio constructions that will be used in the empirical model and provides means and differences 
by firm type.  Collins’ (1985) work provides a theoretical foundation for an empirical strategy to 
understand the key financial characteristics that differentiate co-ops from IOFs using measures of 
firms’ capital structure ൫ߜ௝௧൯,	asset use efficiency ൫ܣܶ ௝ܱ௧൯, operating efficiency ൫݉ܽݎ݅ ௝݊௧൯, and 
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interest.  To operationalize his model for our purposes, we use standard constructs for these 
variables except interest.  Here, the effect of interest is captured by an inverse interest coverage 
ratio ൫ܫܥ ௝ܴ௧൯ covariate.[3]  In addition to the covariates suggested by Collins, our model includes 
measures for liquidity ൫ܮ݅ݍ௝௧൯ and debt structure	൫ܦܾ݁ݐܵݐݎ௝௧൯.  A firm’s liquidity is the ratio of 
the value of inventory (e.g. grain, fertilizer, chemical, fuel) to current assets.  Gabriel and Baker 
(1980) show that liquidity serves as a risk management tool to offset cash shortages, and a large 
inventory relative to total current assets suggests short-term financing needs that will impact a 
firm’s capital structure.  In an extended version of the empirical model presented later, a firm’s 
debt structure – the ratio of long-term liabilities ൫ܮܶܮ௝௧൯ to current liabilities ൫ܥܮ௝௧൯	 – is added to 
examine the difference between impacts of the financial measures on short-term and long-term 
borrowing. 
A key observation from table 1 is that cooperatives in our sample are significantly larger 
than the IOFs in balance sheet and income statement measures.  However, the ratios in table 2 
that enter into the empirical model are relative measures which can be compared among firms of 
various sizes.  To test for statistical significance of these measures between cooperatives and 
IOFs, we estimate the following regression: 
ܨ௝௧௞ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛ௞ݐݕ݌݁௝ ൅ ߤ௝ ൅ ߦ௝௧,     (4) 
where	ܨ௝௧௞ is financial ratio k for firm j at time t; ݐݕ݌݁௝ is a binary variable which takes a value of 
1 if the firm is a cooperative and 0 otherwise, 	ߤ௝		are firm-specific unobserved time-invariant 
effects that capture the difference in firm j’s average measure from the average of other firms of 
the same type, and ߦ௝௧ is the remaining disturbance which satisfies the i.i.d. assumption.  The last 
column in table 2 contains estimates for ߛ௞, the type-specific average differences.[4]  The 
estimates suggest that there are differences in the financial constructs of cooperatives and IOFs, 
and, in particular, rather large differences in their asset use efficiency	൫ܣܶ ௝ܱ௧൯, inventory relative 
to total current assets	൫ܮ݅ݍ௝௧൯, and debt structure	൫ܦܾ݁ݐܵݐݎ௝௧൯.  Consistent with prior studies, 
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cooperative firms in our sample have a lower debt to asset ratio ൫ߜ௝௧൯ on average than do 
investor-owned firms.  Also, these cooperatives on average have a larger proportion of their 
current assets as inventory (versus cash), which may partially explain their relatively lower asset 
use efficiency.[5]  IOFs on average have a higher proportion of their total debt as long-term debt.  
Finally, while interest expense is a greater portion of earnings ൫ܧܤܫ ௝ܶ௧൯ for cooperatives than 
IOFs, the difference is statistically insignificant. Plots of the observed debt-to-asset ratio for each 
firm against its prior year liquidity, profit margin, inverse interest coverage, and asset turnover 
ratios show that a given financial ratio for IOFs tends to have greater variability than for the 
cooperatives in our sample. 
Using equation (3) as the basis for our empirical specification and adding the covariates 
described above, the empirical equation for optimal capital structure is given as:  
ߜ௝௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߛ଴ݐݕ݌݁௝ ൅ ߚଵܮ݅ݍ௝௧+∑ ߚ௞ܨ௞௝,௧ିଵ௄௞ୀଶ 	൅ ߛଵܮ݅ݍ௝௧ ∙ ݐݕ݌݁௝ ൅ ∑ ߛ௞ܨ௝,௧ିଵ௞ ∙ ݐݕ݌݁௝௄௞ୀଶ ൅
ߩ௝௧ ൅ ߝ௝௧,  (5) 
where ߜ௝௧ is firm ݆′ݏ capital structure at time ݐ; 	ݐݕ݌݁௝ is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 
if the firm is a cooperative and 0 otherwise; 	ܨ௝,௧ିଵ௞  is a vector of financial constructs, k, for firm j 
at time t-1 and	ߝ௝௧ is a standard error term.  The term  ߩ௝௧ captures the unobserved firm-specific 
attributes including the firm’s risk attitudes and management quality, expressed as: 
ߩ௝௧ ൌ ߦ௝ ൅ ߙ ௝ܼ௧ ,                           (6) 
where ௝ܼ௧ is the firm’s wealth and  ߦ௝ represents the unobserved firm-specific characteristics that 
impact its risk tolerances. Because the firms in our data are cooperatives and IOFs in the same 
industry in a relatively small geographic area, we impose the assumption that the unobservable 
risk is faced equally by all firms, ߦ௝ ൌ ߦ̅, ∀݆. This becomes a component of the constant term.  
Risk attitudes are linear in a firm’s wealth, measured using the value of fixed assets.   To identify 
the effect that firm type has on capital structure and the firm type-specific effects on financial 
performance measures, we estimate the empirical model in equation (5) with and without firm-
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type interactions using a random effects Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimation 
strategy.[6]   
The DuPont deconstruction of a firm’s return on equity is an identity, and by construction, 
at any time period t, each of the financial measures in the model are determined simultaneously 
and highly correlated.  Endogeneity is a concern that estimation strategies based on the DuPont 
decomposition must address.  We do two things.  First, the explanatory variables are constructed 
so they continue to capture the important financial performance indicators given in the DuPont 
deconstruction while not being identical to elements in the DuPont system. For example, the 
construction of the interest expense ratio and the addition of the liquidity measure vary from the 
standard DuPont decomposition.  Second, we lag the independent variables one-time period.[7]  
Only ܮ݅ݍ௝௧ enters contemporaneously with the debt-to-asset ratio.   
 The empirical regression model in equation (5) incorporates an interaction of firm type 
with the financial covariates[8]. In aggregate, prior theoretical and empirical investigations of 
differences in capital structure between cooperative firms and IOFs suggest ambiguity in the 
firm-type effect.  This estimation strategy allows us to be agnostic about the firms’ objectives and 
adherence to profit maximization.  If the financial constraint hypothesis holds for cooperatives, 
and they rely more heavily on equity than debt to finance activities, the debt-to-asset ratio of 
cooperatives should be less sensitive to interest rate changes relative to IOFs.  We would also 
expect that increases in operating and asset use efficiency would lower the debt level of 
cooperatives as the difficulty in accessing risk capital implies a higher cost of borrowing.[9]  In 
the contrary case, if cooperatives are not able to obtain sufficient equity funds from patron 
members, the limited pool of potential equity investors implies a relatively greater reliance on 
debt financing by cooperatives relative to IOFs.    
 
Results and Discussion  
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Coefficient estimates and model fit statistics are provided in table 3.  Column (1) presents 
the estimates without the interaction terms for firm type and column (2) adds the interaction terms 
between firm-type dummy and financial measures as additional explanatory variables.  Where in 
column 1 the marginal impact on capital structure of financial measures is forced to be equal for 
cooperatives and IOFs, the estimates in column 2 permit them to be different.   
When we allow no distinction by firm type, only the liquidity ratio is significantly related 
to capital structure for these firms.   The positive sign of the coefficient is as expected:  firms with 
a large inventory relative to total current assets on average are more leveraged. Once the 
interaction terms are added, however, differences emerge between the two firm types both in 
terms of the magnitude and direction of the effect of financial measures and capital structure.  
The estimated coefficient on firm-type is significant and negative, indicating that cooperatives in 
our sample carry lower leverage than their in-state counterparts.  That cooperatives in our sample 
rely more on equity financing than the IOFs may not be the result of a borrowing constraint but 
rather a reflection of the member-benefit objective of the cooperatives.  
Table 4 presents the marginal effects on debt to asset ratio for each of the financial 
measures for each firm type with elasticities provided in the brackets.   The results for the 
cooperative firms are consistent with Collins’ model.  Higher profit margin and asset turnover are 
associated with increased leverage, and while the coefficient on the inverse interest coverage ratio 
is insignificant, it is negative, as predicted by the theory.    
Interestingly, the empirical relationship between profit margin and debt to asset ratio is 
distinctly different between co-ops and IOFs.  This suggests that higher profit margins, which 
ceteris paribus, imply firms are able to generate more internal cash flow, result in deleveraging 
activities for IOFs but increasing the leverage for co-ops. In other words, IOFs tend to rely more 
on equity financing as they become more profitable, while co-ops increase debt financing.  The 
estimated elasticity on Margin implies that a 10 percent increase in profit margin results in a 10 
percent increase in debt to asset ratio for the cooperative firms.  More  leverage  is associated 
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with higher sales, perhaps because it allows the cooperatives to either invest more in capital, such 
as equipment or storage capacity in the long run, or enables cooperatives  to purchase more 
product from members in the near term. Combining this finding with the impact of inventory to 
current ratio on capital structure, the latter case seems more plausible.  
For both cooperatives and IOFs, a greater inventory to current asset ratio results in higher 
leverage; however cooperatives are on average more sensitive to inventory-related changes than 
are IOFs.  For cooperatives, the estimated elasticity implies that a 10 percent increase in the 
inventory to current assets ratios is associated with a 5.5 percent increase in the debt to asset ratio.  
This is roughly four times as large as the estimated elasticity for IOFs. For additional units of 
inventory per unit of current assets, co-ops borrow more to finance the inventory than do IOFs.  
Overall, the estimation results show that cooperatives rely less on debt financing than IOFs in 
our sample, which is consistent with the hypothesis that cooperatives may face greater difficulty 
accessing the external capital market relative to similar IOFs. An alternative hypothesis that 
cannot be ruled out is that cooperatives use more equity financing because managers view it as a 
costless source of capital.   We do observe that cooperatives are likely to seek more debt 
financing when operating efficiency, as characterized by operating margin and asset turnover, 
improves.   
One limitation of this analysis is that the financial ratios are only lagged by one period. Thus, 
the evidence of a capital constraint for cooperatives suggested here is only relevant to short-term 
borrowing.  The impact of long-term borrowing cost on cooperatives’ capital structure is not clear.  
To investigate this issue further, we add a measure of debt structure (the lagged ratio of long-term 
liabilities to current liabilities) to our model to examine the potential difference in financing 
strategies between the two firm types.  Long-term borrowing finances firms’ long-lived assets 
whereas current liabilities reflect borrowing for operations. [10] Firms with a higher proportion of 
long-term debt to current debt will have a higher debt-to-asset ratio, if firms finance investments 
with debt, as opposed to equity capital.  Summary statistics of the debt ratio measure are 
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presented in table 2. Note that long-term liabilities are only 15% of the value of current liabilities 
for the cooperatives in the sample, which is about one-third the proportion for IOFs.  
The third column of table 3 presents the regression results, and the marginal effects are 
shown in table 4. The estimates on the other financial measures are robust to this change in 
specification. Comparing the marginal effect of debt structure on leverage between co-ops and 
IOFs in table 4, we find that as long-term liabilities increase relative to current liabilities, the 
debt-to-asset ratio increases for IOFs, but has no impact for cooperatives. This suggests that for 
cooperatives, debt structure does not significantly impact leverage.  This may reflect a greater 
reliance on equity rather than debt to finance the long-lived capital assets, perhaps because they 
view equity as a costless source of capital, or co-ops may just take a conservative investment 
strategy, financing fixed assets with available equity (Lerman and Parliament, 1993).  
 
Conclusions 
Utilizing panel data of agricultural grain and supply firms in Iowa, we find that ownership 
structure does impact the operating capital structure of a firm. Our empirical findings have shown 
that cooperatives are less leveraged on average, relative to IOFs but the evidence that 
cooperatives face a capital constraint is mixed. While we find that cooperatives in our sample 
have lower debt to asset ratios on average than IOFs, our regression results suggest that as 
cooperative firms become more profitable and more efficient in their use assets, they increase 
their leverage, whereas IOFs do the opposite.  The positive effects of increasing inventories on 
debt to asset ratios suggest that the increased leverage is likely tied to short-term borrowing to 
finance inventories.  Yet, when we compare debt structure between cooperatives and IOFs, we 
find that cooperatives have much lower ratios of long-term to current debt and that debt structure 
does not impact overall leverage for cooperatives.  This suggests that cooperatives tend to use 
more equity to finance investments relative to IOFs, and could reflect a constraint on long-term 
borrowing, or could indicate that managers view equity as a costless source of capital, or perhaps, 
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just reflect a more conservative investment approach.  These short- and long-run differences have 
implications for the survival and growth of agricultural cooperatives.  While in the short run, 
access to debt financing allows these firms to operate profitably, ultimately in the longer term, 
large investments in technology and fixed assets will be required to maintain competitiveness in 
this industry.   Future work in this area to further investigate these short-term and longer-term 
differences could lead to an improved understanding of the extent and nature of these financial 
constraints.  
                                                            
1 As a reviewer noted, in cooperative parlance, “profits” are usually called “net margins,” “net 
earnings,” “net returns,” or “net income.” They may also be referred to as “savings.”  Throughout 
the paper we will use the terms profits and earnings interchangeably. 
2 We omit from our analysis three firms reporting a debt-to-asset ratio greater than one. 
3Two common measures for capturing the effect of interest are the interest expense ratio and the 
interest coverage ratio.  The interest expense ratio is a firm’s interest expense divided by debt.  
The interest coverage ratio is profit before taxes and interest expense (EBIT) divided by interest 
expense.  We use an inverse interest coverage ratio (ܫ݊ݐ௝௧) to avoid the issue of dividing by zero 
as some observations in our data have no interest expense.  Also, because our explanatory 
variable is a measure of debt, the interest expense ratio would introduce endogeneity as a firm’s 
interest rate, and therefore interest expense, is affected by the amount of debt it carries. 
4 Since our sample consists of firms selected randomly from the population of grain and farm 
supply firms in Iowa; we assume ߤ௝ is uncorrelated with firm type. 
5 This is consistent with the cooperative culture: cooperatives tend to maintain inventories for the 
benefit of their members, even when it is not most efficient or profitable to do so.  This means 
they need, relatively speaking, larger operating lines to finance these current assets. 
6 The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects (RE) indicates the 
existence of unobserved individual attributes that need to be controlled for. The model was also 
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estimated in a fixed effects (FE) framework. We compared the FE and RE specifications using 
the robust Hausman test (Woodridge, 2010) due to the presence of heteroskedasticity across firms, 
and we cannot reject the assumption that independent variables are uncorrelated with individual 
unobservables.  If we control for time fixed effects and firm type in the RE specification, all 
estimates are similar to those under FE and bear the same signs. So we conclude that time fixed 
effects and firm type capture the unobservable factors reasonably well under RE, and RE is an 
appropriate specification for the subsequent analysis. 
7 ܧ௧ିଵሺܨ௞௝௧ሻ is the expected value of financial covariate k for firm j at time ݐ.  We assume it takes 
a naïve expectation form given by ܧ௧ିଵሺܨ௞௝௧ሻ ൌ ܨ௞௝,௧ିଵ. 
8 The IOFs in our study can be of various business structures, e.g., sole proprietorships, 
corporations, LLCs.    A reviewer suggested that including IOF business type in our model would 
be more informative about the effect of business type on financial performance and capital.   
However, our data do not permit us to identify the firm structure of the IOFs. 
9  Chaddad, Cook, and Heckelei (2005) test for the presence of financial constraints in 
cooperatives using panel data for U.S. agricultural cooperatives from CoBank by examining the 
sensitivity of investment in physical assets to cash flow.  The key hypothesis is that investment 
should not be a function of cash flow if cooperatives do not face financing constraints; yet the 
authors do find a positive and significant effect of cash flow in investment.  In comparison, cash 
flow does not affect investment in a comparable sample of IOFs in the food manufacturing 
industry. 
10 Current liabilities may also include proceeds payable to members at the end of the year, so they 
may be greater for cooperatives than IOFs (Royer, 1991). 
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Table 1.  Description of Variables  
  Cooperatives Investor-Owned Firms 
Variable  Description 
Mean 
(in millions) 
St. dev. 
(in millions) 
Mean 
(in millions) 
St. dev. 
(in millions) 
Ajt Total Assets  $8.50 $1.02 $1.77 $2.24 
Djt Total Liabilities $4.25 $4.60 $ 0.96 $1.20 
Πjt Pre-tax Profit $0.34 $0.43 $0.05 $0.12 
Revjt Total Revenue $21.11 $25.30 $6.83 $7.45 
Sjt Sales (Revenue – non-operating income) $20.10 $24.70 $6.69 $7.32 
EBITit Earning before tax and interest $0.49 $0.48 $0.09 $0.01 
Intjt Annual Interest Expense $0.16 $0.16 $0.05 $0.06 
CAjt Current Assets $4.86 $8.64 $1.10 $1.22 
Zjt Fixed Assets $2.15 $1.98 $0.57 $0.99 
Invjt Inventory $2.94 $3.21 $0.55 $0.84 
LTLjt Long-Term Liabilities $0.62 $0.99 $0.24 $0.43 
CLjt Current Liabilities $3.62 $3.90 $0.725 $0.88 
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Table 2. Firm-type average financial ratios 
  Cooperatives IOFs 
 
Ratios Definition Mean Mean Difference 
ߜ௝௧  Debt to Asset Ratio = ܦ௝௧/ܣ௝௧  0.468 0.519 -0.052* 
marginjt Operating Profit Margin = ߨ௝௧ ܴ݁ݒ௝௧⁄ 0.1387 0.1474 -0.008 
ATOjt Asset Turnover = ௝ܵ௧	 ܣ௝௧⁄  2.467 5.115 -2.648*** 
Liqjt Liquidity = ܫ݊ݒ௝௧	 ܥܣ௝௧⁄  0.605 0.434 0.170*** 
ICR
jt
 Inverse Interest coverage ratio= ܫ݊ݐ௝௧/ܧܤܫ ௝ܶ௧ 0.318 0.0689 0.249 
DebtStr
jt Debt Structure = ܮܶܮ௝௧/ܥܮ௝௧ 0.157 0.477 -0.290*** 
Notes: * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%. 
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Table 3.  Random effects estimates of equation (5) 
 
 
 
Notes: Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance levels as follows: 
* 10 percent; ** 5 percent; and *** 1 percent significance.   
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Liquidity 0.240*** 0.125*** 0.155*** 
 (0.034) (0.047) (0.047) 
Margin -0.017 -0.568*** -0.594*** 
(0.176) (0.230) (0.226) 
ATO 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
(0.0037) (0.003) (0.003) 
ICR 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.0028) 
type (= 1 if co-op) -0.586*** -0.537*** 
(0.085) (0.085) 
type*Liquidity 0.299*** 0.273*** 
(0.065) (0.064) 
type*Margin 1.555*** 1.478*** 
(0.357) (0.357) 
type*ICR -0.0030 -0.003 
(0.007) (0.0034) 
type*ATO 0.039*** 0.035*** 
(0.010) (0.011) 
Debt Structure 0.055*** 
(0.013) 
type*Debt Structure -0.001 
(0.045) 
Fixed Asset 0.001 0.001** 0.001** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Yr94 (dummy) -0.003 0.001 0.0045 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Yr95 (dummy) 0.346*** 0.030*** 0.033 *** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 0.335*** 0.549*** 0.514*** 
  (0.039) (0.051) (0.051) 
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Table 4. Estimated marginal effects on capital structure, difference between firm types 
 Cooperatives Investor Owned Firms Difference 
Margin 1.088*** 
(0.001) 
-0.5938*** 
(0.019) 
1.4784*** 
(<0.001) 
 [0.322] [-0.169]  
ATO 0.0342*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.152) 
0.0382*** 
(0.001) 
 [0.180] [-0.039]  
Liquidity 0.4277*** 
(< 0.001) 
0.1551*** 
(0.001) 
0.2726*** 
(<0.001) 
 [0.553] [0.130]  
ICR -0.0020 
(0.548) 
0.0011 
(0.548) 
-0.0031 
(0.390) 
 [-0.001] [<0.001]  
Debt. Str 0.0548 
(0.207) 
0.0548*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.00001 
(1.000) 
 [0.018] [0.050]  
Notes: Marginal effects and elasticities estimated from the random effects model on debt to asset ratio.  
P-value in parentheses. Significance levels indicated as: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  Elasticities in brackets. 
